There is a school of thought that says that the value of a business is entirely in its future cash flows and that all assets are tools that provide that cash flow. In essence, many people believe that assets and equity should be ignored entirely. Let's look at it from a private owner perspective and follow it up later in the week with an examination of Buffett's early partnership letters:
The idea behind ignoring the assets is theoretically sound: The net assets produce the cash flows. Any reduction in net assets would reduce cash flows. Thus, the value of a business is comprised entirely of the future cash flows, plus excess capital that the business has.
So, what is considered excess capital? It is easy to say that additional cash above and beyond the company's working capital needs is "excess" capital. What else might be considered excess capital?
We know that we should buy stocks as though we owned the entire business. In his January 18, 1963 letter to investors, Buffett said:
When control of a company is obtained, obviously what then becomes all-important is the value of assets, not the market quotation for a piece of paper (stock certificate).
So that there is no confusion as to his wording of "the value of assets," Buffett then went on to show, in part, his calculation of value by presenting the balance sheet and his assessment of value for the company's net worth (equity).
Let's examine two simple businesses (the type we should be investing in). In this case, both companies generate $1 million a year in revenue, $250,000 a year in net income, and $300,000 a year in owner earnings:
| in $ Thousands | Company A | Company B | |
| Revenue | $ 1,000 | $ 1,000 | |
| Expenses | 750 | 750 | |
| Net Income | 250 | 250 | |
| Owner Earnings | 300 | 300 |
To add a little more information, both are consulting firms in the same industry — each with 10 employees, both in the same location (just a city block apart), both having 100,000 shares outstanding, and neither having any long-term liabilities. In fact, except for one critical item (and I'll get to that in a minute), these businesses would appear to be equal — and their valuations would also be equal.
The one thing that separates these two companies resides on the balance sheet — a building. Company A operates out of a fully-owned, zero-mortgage building; Company B leases office space. Because the annual property tax plus depreciation for Company A is equal to the annual lease cost for Company B, the numbers work out identical. Other minor, but relevant, charges make net income and owner earnings the same.
Their respective balance sheets appear as follows:
| in $ Thousands | Company A | Company B | |
| ASSETS | |||
| Current Assets | |||
| Cash & Cash Equivalents | $ 50 | $ 50 | |
| Net Receivables | 25 | 25 | |
| Total Current Assets | 75 | 75 | |
| Property, Plant, & Equipment | 450 | - | |
| Total Assets | 525 | 75 | |
| LIABILITIES | |||
| Current Liabilities | |||
| Accounts Payable | 12 | 12 | |
| Total Current Liabilities | 12 | 12 | |
| Other Liabilities | - | - | |
| Total Liabilities | 12 | 12 | |
| Total Stockholder Equity | 513 | 63 | |
As you look at these two companies, which would appear more valuable. Under the "ignore the balance sheet" calculation, the value of that building (and other hard assets that don't appear in the "excess capital" calculation) would be zero.
Using the F Wall Street valuation, Company A is worth $5.65 million. Using the "ignore the assets" valuation (assuming 10 years of cash flow plus 10x the sale price), the valuation is similar — $5.63 million. (For both, I assumed 10% growth for three years, followed by 8% for three years, followed by 6% for four. Then, 5% going forward for F Wall Street valuation.)
All things being equal, the valuations come out to be about the same. So, is there value in the assets?
Again, it is our job to think like business owners. What is the safeguard provided by Company B? That is, if the consulting business goes down the tubes, what happens to your investment? Company B would liquidate and pay shareholders a total of roughly $63. Company A would pay us $513.
Of course, we didn't pay full price for those assets. We got the building at a discount (part of our margin of safety) and so we expect to recoup more than Company B shareholders.
What if the companies don't go out of business? Instead, they continue on at the rates assumed (above). However, Company A hires a consultant that tells management to sell the building and swap down to lease office space like its competitor does.
Company A does just that. Now, the company has an additional $450,000 in cash. According to the "ignore the assets" school, the business just became immediately worth $450,000 more because it has "excess" capital, and now they would value the company at $6.08 million ($5.63 million plus $450,000 in excess capital).
Here's the problem: Company A now looks exactly like Company B, except that Company A converted its building into cash (excess capital). The day before the building was sold, Company A (according to the "ignore the assets" school) was worth $5.63 million (the same as Company B). The day after the building was sold, Company A was worth $450,000 more.
Did the company really increase $450,000 in value? Or, was that value there, and simply ignored? Is Company A worth $5.63 million when it owns a building, but worth $6.08 million when it converts that building into cash?
Each company has two values — the assets and the future cash. Some assets are critical earning assets — assets that the company needs to generate owner earnings. Some are non-earning assets that simply add to the value of the company.
If you ignore the balance sheet and assets, you can get caught with your pants down when your business converts non-earning assets into cash, and you pay considerably more for the same business.
We'll end with another early Buffett quote, this time regarding the Sanborn Map purchase:
This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of $90 per share on the map business ($110 less the $20 value of the investments unrelated to the map business) in a year of depressed business and stock market conditions. In the tremendously more vigorous climate of 1958 the same map business was evaluated at a minus $20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than [seventy cents] on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing.
The take-home lesson: Buffett put one value on the assets and another on the business (or future owner earnings). He mashed them together, and bought a business at a substantial discount. Lest you think that the "investment portfolio" was simply excess capital, had the company been selling for 70 cents on the dollar with tons of money in real estate (that wouldn't show up as excess capital), it would have still been a great play.
Think Burlington Northern.
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Mon @ 12:45PM | View comment
g said,
good timing!
BreitBurn Energy: Playing the Commodities Crash
Sun @ 1:14AM | View comment
mike said,
ROIC is not based on earnings. it's just EBIT * (1-t) / invested capital. The flaw with ROIC...
What The Heck Is CROIC?
Thu @ 8:00AM | View comment
Cale Smith said,
New Ponzio Capital site looks great, Joe, and good to see you back posting!
BreitBurn Energy: Playing the Commodities Crash
Wed @ 5:50PM | View comment
kalidasa said,
in correction to an earlier post, it is Sham Gad(www.gadcapital.com) or www.shamgad.blogspot.com
Hedge Funds and the Early Buffett Partnership
Tue @ 3:29PM | View comment
Joe Ponzio said,
I think it got overheated. I still feel like it's a good long-term holding (if the buy price is right)....
Is Nutrisystem Healthy?
Tue @ 2:48PM | View comment
Nutrisystem Coupon said,
Dude, what happened to this stock? You would think in January this stock would be jumping through the roof...
Is Nutrisystem Healthy?
BPal
Jan 14th, 2008
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BPal
Jan 14th, 2008
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Wayne
Jan 14th, 2008
Not to take away from the point of your post, but the F Wall Street valuation of $5.65 puzzles me. I understood the value to be (1) the present value at 15% of FCF of 300k growing at 10%/3 8%/4 6%/4 5%/10, plus (2) Stockholders Equity of 513k. I calculate this to be $3.3 .513 = $3.813. Maybe I am missing something ?
More broadly, It seems if we simply use your F Wall Street valuation method the risk of ignoring assets like the above example is eliminated. Agree?
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Joe Ponzio
Jan 14th, 2008
Joe on twitter
Ponzio Capital
As far as the value being built in, take a look at the change in valuation when the building is sold. Under the ignore the assets model, the valuation went up by $450,000 simply because the building was sold. If, to make things simple, you made the adjustments to drop net income (which isn't used in either), but kept owner earnings the same, the results would be the same.
Wayne: I used a 9% discount rate. If you changed it to a 15% (or 5%, or 20%) for both models, the end number would be different, but the results would be the same. At 15%, ignore the assets: $3.80M before the sale, $4.25M after the sale; F Wall Street: $3.75M before and after the sale.
The risk of ignoring the assets is eliminated because we don't ignore the assets — we analyze them like business owners and identify the value of the assets and the business. Make sense?
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Wayne
Jan 14th, 2008
Thanks, that explains it. What I take away here is to keep it simple and use your F Wall Street method.
Now if I could only figure out what I am missing on the valuation of BNI. I calcluate a 15% growth in FCF for 20 years is needed to get to a valuation at the current market price (which is approx where Buffet is a buyer). That seems optimistic given the company expects revenue growth of 7%-8%.
The 2006 annual report say that Property and Equipment are stated at cost. Maybe the value is much higher than the $29bln of P&E they currently report?
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david
Jan 14th, 2008
I get a valuation of about $95 if I ignore 1997. That's still not high enough to justify a purchase at $80/share. My guess is that this Buffett is doing something more complex than simple undervaluation -- I think it could be confluence factors, just as the that KO purchase was. some of these factors could be...
1. the infrastructure costs required to run a Railroad provides BNI with an exceptionally Wide Moat. You won't see new entrants into the Railroad market.
2. In the trucking industry, when the cost of fuel goes up, the trucker's margins shrink accordingly. In the railroad industry, all of the fuel costs are assumed by the customer.
3. BNI is spending alot of money to beef up their infrastructure and increase efficiency.
4. Trade between Mexico and Canada is increasing; BNI had significant capacity on this route.
The fact that Buffett started buying several railroad companies, but then sold off all of them except BNI makes me think that buffett might have been honing his decision as he went. On the other hand, perhaps he was buying the other companies just to keep his intensions unclear.
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Tom
Jan 14th, 2008
I posted this previously, but since BNI has come up again here I wanted to repost with some more detail. I believe, but I want to check with Joe and the group, that the "missing piece" to BNI is the "maintenance" versus "expansion" capex, similar to Joe's prior analysis of Wal-Mart regarding the opening of addional stores. BNI is using cash every year to buy new engines, lay new rail and increase the size of its operations, and its potential future returns, which I believe should be taken into account in our analysis.
Really, it seems that this adding back of expansion capex is something that should be done for every business that we evaluate, as in theory, every business is trying to expand. For WMT that is additional stores, and for BNI that is additional tracks, engines, etc. to expand the business. Further, it seems we should add back in cash used for dividends and share repurchases, as this is cash the business generates that is available, and does, go to the owners.
So my question is when do we decide to undertake this additional evaluation? This is an exercise that clearly has a large effect on our valuation, but may not be immediately noticeable.
For what it's worth, after this work-up I get a target price for BNI of $85 with a 25% margin of safety (total value is 112 per share using a 15% discount rate). (although anyone should feel free to poke holes or chime in...)
Here are the differences in annual FCF when you add "expansion" cap-ex and dividends/share repurchases back to morningstar numbers:
1997 -- negative 368.0 (morningstar number) versus $425 (full cash flow)
1998 -- 71 v. 1,051
1999 -- 636 v. 1,675
2000 -- 918 v. 3,133
2001 -- 738 v. 1,362
2002 -- 748 v. 1,398
2003 -- 559 v. 1,455
2004 -- 850 v. 1,680
2005 -- 859 v. 2,914
2006 -- 1,094 v. 2,584
So, the column on the right is the amount of cash that BNI generated each year. The choice was then whether to (i) return this cash to the owners via dividends and share repurchases, (ii) to invest in expanding the business or (iii) hold as cash for the future. The left column thus should represent item (iii) -- the total FCF available.
To get the true picture of the business, shouldn't our valuation be based on all three? We should also take into account the CROIC to determine if management is deciding wisely between options (i), (ii) and (iii) before we invest, but this seems to present a more complete overall picture.
Thanks again for the great blog, this site really is fantastic at breaking things down in a simple and easy way, and we all appreciate the time you put in!
Tom
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Babui
Jan 14th, 2008
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Tom
Jan 14th, 2008
The left column thus should represent item (iii) -- the FCF available after cash is used for options (i) and (ii).
Thanks.
Tom
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kfh227
Jan 14th, 2008
27 comments
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Chungst
Jan 15th, 2008
10 comments
Joe:
Why do you makes things so hard on yourself!!!! Any cash-based analyst or any good analyst worth his salt knows that NOT ALL ASSETS are on the balance sheet! Livnat covers this point in his book, Fried covers this as well, so many accounting professors go over this topic -- deficiencies of financial statements. Take management for example.
Managament is not on the balance sheet per US GAAP. However, when you have a guy like Buffett or Munger or Jack Welch versus Bernie Ebbers or Kenneth Lay managing the same company -- and thus the same assets, you get two different sets of value. That is enough to shoot that theory down period.
Again, I have no idea why this is even an issue. URGH!!! Going back to my hole.
Regards,
-C
Again, please link or refence the site -- please do not post the message outside www.fwallstreet.com. Thank you.
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Wayne
Jan 15th, 2008
Tom: The BNI quarterly investor reports show CapEx broken out between maintenance and expansion. Here is the CapEx used for new locomotives and line/terminal expansion (first column), and the result of adding it back to FCF:
1998 844 71 = 915
1999 513 636 1149
2000 133 918 1051
2001 126 738 864
2002 103 748 851
2003 488 559 1047
2004 239 850 1089
2005 389 859 1248
2006 450 1094 1544
This certainly makes BNI look more attractive and worth considering a purchase. However, the sub-par ROIC (consistent and averaging 4% for the last 10 years) makes me wonder if the expansion CapEx is a wise use of FCF.
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Tom
Jan 15th, 2008
Wayne:
Thank you for the response....
While I used BNI as an example, my questions is more conceptual, in that I am wondering why this approach (Joe's Wal-Mart analysis) is not used for all companies. It seems to me that to get the true picture of cash generation, you need to add back cash spent on expansion and cash returned to the owners. Then you can value the company and decide whether management is using cash appropriately before making an investment decision.
Thanks again.
Tom
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Joe Ponzio
Jan 16th, 2008
Joe on twitter
Ponzio Capital
You are precisely right - we should be figuring out what capital spending is for growth vs. maintenance. It is a question of growth; namely, is your company plowing money into capital expenditures because it is expanding or because it has to. As such, each company must be analyzed individually. I've said it before - just because I have posted my spreadsheets on particular companies doesn't mean those spreadsheets will work precisely on all companies.
In the case of Johnson & Johnson, capital expenditures and depreciation are substantially the same. That is, JNJ does not need to make huge capital expenditures (in relation to depreciation) to maintain its ground competitively. Quite the opposite is true in, for example, GM which has had to spend $114 billion in capital expenditures (net of depreciation) just to try and keep competitive. That is money that we silent partners will likely never recoup.
What would happen to GM if it didn't spend that money just to maintain its operations? It would shrink - in real terms - to nothing.
So, to answer your original question: this approach should be used for all businesses. I know that some people have modified my spreadsheet to quickly screen, analyze and present hundreds of companies at a time. While they are free to do so, it takes away from the whole point: Find quality companies, analyze them as a silent partner, and then buy when the price is right.
Make sense?
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Nish
Jan 18th, 2008
Some time back, i disputed your approach of adding 'net worth' to 'PV of future owner's earnings' to derive the 'value of the business'. That was strictly from a theoretical point of view, but i understand now why you do so, from a practical point of view. Even at that earlier instance, i mentioned that everyone has to eventually derive and modify his own model of calculation, and i can see that is exactly what you have done.
The objective here is to find a link between 'upside potential' and 'downside protection' of a stock. When an analyst focusses only on P/E ratios or DDM, he is only looking at the earnings potential of a business i.e. the 'upside potential'. However, if for some reason, this business suddenly loses its earning potential tomorrow, there is no protection/floor on this stock price. It can literally go to zero. On the other hand, if someone focusses only on the P/B ratio or 'Net current assets', he is only focussed on the downside protection of the stock; he will buy cheap stocks, that will have a good liquidation value, BUT there may be no earnings potential at all and hence, no point in buying such a stock.
Thus, an extreme focus on either approach may not be optimal, and hence the need to connect the potential returns (if the business keeps going) with the potential risk (if the business stops tomorrow). That is exactly what you have done, by introducing 'Book value" into 'DDM'. There are also other ways to achieve this objective.
Anyway i have one main feedback for you. Lets say we use your model to value two companies A and B. A has no net worth at all, but its present value of all future owner's earnings is $100. So you will price it at $100. Then, we have company B, which has cash of $100, but no earnings at all. Even this company will be priced at $100 by your model. Quantitatively, you should be indifferent between these two, when actually you may never want to buy company B. Of course, qualitatively you will rule 'B' out, but what i want to know is that, quantitatively, do you have any way to address this problem. This is the only drawback of your model that i think of right now.
Cheers.
Nish.
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Mike
Jan 23rd, 2009
Using the "ignore the assets" valuation (assuming 10 years of cash flow plus 10x the sale price), the valuation is similar - $5.63 million.
I don't understand what 10x the sale price is?
Thanks,
Mike
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Your Name
Feb 9th, 2010