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Coca-Cola, Ten Years and Still No Growth

July 10, 2007  |  Joe Ponzio  |  about:

If you bought Coca-Cola (ticker: KO) on January 2, 1996 and held it through December 29, 2006, you would have had a 10% gain, or about 0.92% average annual return for ten years (when factoring in dividends). Sure, you would have had some big ups and downs, but stock prices generally follow value in the long run. Knowing that, investors could have avoided a lackluster return with just a few minutes of work.

First, let’s take a look at the value of Coca-Cola’s business at the end of 1996. You can follow along by looking at the 1996 spreadsheet:

From 1987 though 1996, KO grew Free Cash Flow a median rate of 16.2%. Stellar. In addition, it generated roughly $0.42 of cash for every dollar of invested capital. Even better! Shareholder equity was growing at about 8% which isn’t that great. Still, we can put a value on the company.

Getting Coca-Cola’s 1996 Value

Shareholder equity plus our estimation of the future Free Cash Flow gives us a value of $75,752 million. Divide that by the number of outstanding shares at the end of 1996 gives us a per-share value of $30.42. But Coca-Cola never hit $30.42, let alone our target price of $22.84 when factoring in a 25% margin of safety. In 1997, Coca-Cola’s stock traded between $50 and $72.62, well above the value of the company.

One of three things had to happen:

  1. Coca-Cola’s value would rise quickly to justify the high price; or,
  2. The price would have to hold steady until Coca-Cola’s value crept up to it; or,
  3. The price would have to drop to a level more consistent with Coca-Cola’s value.

On a daily and monthly basis, price can do anything. Over the long-term, price follows value.

What to Do With Coca-Cola In 1996

The goal of long-term investing is to buy a wonderful company at a fair or bargain price. In the case of Coca-Cola, investors were buying a business at a high price-well more than the company was worth if an investor wanted to earn 15% or more on an annualized basis.

The long and short of it is simple: You can’t overpay for a business, and then be surprised when you lose money (or don’t make a lot). In the case of KO, you could have speculated on its stock price and made some money, but you could not have reasonably expected to be a long-term, stellar-return holder of KO’s stock when buying it in 1996.

Fast Forward to 2007

As it turns out, Situation Two (above) occurred-the stock price moved up and down greatly from month to month, but the long-term price held fairly level at the 1996 price. You can see a chart of its price movement (using end-of-day prices). The red dashed line connects the 1996 price to the end of 2006 price.

What about Coca-Cola’s value? Here’s the 2006 analysis.

The value hasn’t changed much-from $30.45 a share at the end of 1996 to $30.85 a share at the end of 2006. Price follows value, so it is no surprise to see that Coca-Cola’s price, on a long-term basis, barely moved an inch.

But Coca-Cola Grew!

Yes, Coca-Cola’s net worth grew by more than $10 billion. If you bought KO in 1996 and it shut down in 2006, you would be entitled to your fair share of that extra $10 billion. But Coca-Cola isn’t shutting down and the value of the company is not simply its net worth.

Coca-Cola has a value as an ongoing business-its intrinsic value. Though its “break-up” value grew from 1996 through 2006, its intrinsic value, and hence its value, as an ongoing business stayed fairly flat.

Did Mr. Buffett Screw Up With Coca-Cola?

Warren Buffett bought Coca-Cola in 1988, back when the company was growing rapidly. If our valuation methods are similar, he likely projected ten years of great growth from 1989-1998, followed by ten years of slowed growth.

During the first ten years, Coca-Cola’s free cash flow grew roughly 12.7% a year and its shareholder equity grew 9.9% a year. With Mr. Buffett’s margin of safety, his investment grew much more rapidly.

Remember that Warren Buffett bought Coca-Cola back in 1988 when it was a very attractive company selling at a fair price. That was nearly 20 years ago. Today, Coca-Cola is not as attractive and not selling at a fair price. Does Buffett care? Sure, he’d love to see all of his companies growing rapidly forever.

Will he sell? Probably not. He likely paid for 20 years’ worth of growth. Anything beyond that simply adds to his wealth. So long as Coca-Cola is growing, no matter how quickly or slowly, he probably won’t be going anywhere.

So no, he didn’t screw up.

What It All Adds Up To

At any given time, you could have made a little or a lot of money by speculating in Coca-Cola’s stock from 1997 through 2006. Traders and gamblers pushed the stock as high as $88.94 and as low as $37.01 during that time. The ones who got hurt were the long-term investors (and the gamblers on the wrong side of the trades).

A look at the business of Coca-Cola could have saved you ten years’ worth of ups, downs, and ultimately a flat return. Remember, buying stock is buying a piece of a business. If you don’t know the value of your business, you are simply gambling.

Joe Ponzio

By Joe Ponzio

July 10, 2007

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The Discussion
Dan
Dan
July 24, 2007 at 8:36pm

by looking at the EPS at 1996 (1.4) and at 2006 (2.37). It seems value in 2006 is more than 1996. Any idea?

Dan

July 25, 2007 at 2:00am

Hi Dan,

You are right – earnings grew which meant that the company was generating more taxable income. But, when you buy a business, you buy the future cash that can be taken out of the business.

In the case of Coca-Cola, growth had slowed so much that the future cash (from 1996) did not appear to be growing rapidly. Because things didn’t change much by 2006 and the company’s future cash still looks like it will grow slowly, the value of the business has not changed much.

Think of it in terms of a CD. A 1-year CD offering $50 in interest for a $1,000 investment (5%) is worth the same today as it was ten years ago. If your business can’t generate higher and higher amounts of cash, it will find itself at “critical mass” and will hold, not grow, in value just like the CD.

Charlie
Charlie
August 9, 2007 at 1:50am

In the 1996 analysis, the projected free cash flows for 1997-2006 are so much more than the actual values of these years shown in the 2006 analysis. Does this mean that the 16.2% growth rate is not a good number to use in the 1996 analysis?

August 13, 2007 at 10:15am

Hi Charlie,

Hindsight is 20/20 so to answer your question – yes, 16.2% is too high a value. In 1996, all we knew was that Coke was growing owner earnings at 16.2%. Unless we had a reason to suspect that it wouldn’t continue, 16.2% is the only number we had to go on.

Here’s the thing: Using the actual results, the value of Coke was actually much lower than we estimated in 1996. As such, the idea that investors should have expected no growth was further reinforced.

Alan
Alan
June 21, 2008 at 6:37pm

Hi,

i’m trying to get my head around value investing and have been reading the Warren Buffet way. The valuation of Coke in the book using discounted owner earnings is considerably different to the valuation for the same period using the method on this website. I can’t get the two to correlate. Any ideas? I’ve spent a good few hours looking into this.

Thanks…

June 22, 2008 at 2:11pm

Alan,

Check out this post – a review of The Warren Buffett way, and specifically Coca-Cola. Hope it helps. If not, let me know.

Navsi
Navsi
September 15, 2008 at 2:59pm

Hey

I have just started learning about long term investing. Could you please help me know how to value the business of a company. And also what is the intrinsic value of a company.

Thanks

Navsi

September 16, 2008 at 7:49pm

Navsi,

Check out the series of posts beginning with Part I of How to Value a Business.

WJ
WJ
November 30, 2008 at 2:18am

Assuming Warren Buffett bought in 1988 at $40, a discount to the est. per share value of 59.16.

10 yrs later, in 1996, he revisited the valuation and came to the est. per share value of 30.45.

Why did he not want to sell off when the market was maybe offering the price range of $50-72? Since in 1996, the $40 share price he bought would have been overvalued to the 1996 intrinsic value.

Moving forward to 2006, the est. per share value haven’t moved much at 30.85.

But market is still offering it at 40-60plus per share, why didn’t he want to sell it off then?

Would it be because during the past 20 years, he have gotten more than enough dividends from the company and have effectively lowered his cost price to even below the intrinsic value of 2006.

If that is the case, would it be more prudent for us investors to pursue constantly companies that pay dividends, instead of those who we think can re-invest the cashflow more effectively using the ROIC?

As can be since in the Coke case, the ROIC projected returns was 9.3%, 41.9%, 23.9% 10yrs apart. As much as we believe the management can delivered on the ROIC, but the fluctuation is so great that it is better for us to have cash in hand (dividends) and re-invest where we want to.

david trahms
david trahms
December 1, 2008 at 10:53pm

Buffett did sell some of his Coke stock.  He traded it at a P/E of 167 times earnings, in the General Re deal.  See chapter 15…The New Buffettology.   It was also a tax free exchange!

Lyle Trahms
Lyle Trahms
August 10, 2009 at 10:20am

I suppose if Buffet sell some Coke stock you bought some right away. I hope you did very well with that stock.

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