Businesses generally expand in three ways – increased sales of existing products, sales (and increased sales) of new products, and acquisitions to expand product lines. We looked at “increased sales of existing products” in Can They Increase Sales For Several Years? Fisher then went on to talk about “sales (and increased sales) of new products”:
Does the management have a determination to continue to develop products or processes that will still further increase total sales potentials when the growth potentials of currently attractive product lines have largely been exploited?
There are two schools of thought on this subject – the rational, business-like approach and the “other” approach.
The “Other” Approach
There is an old saying in business: Throw enough sh*t at the wall, and something’s gotta stick. In practice, many business owners (i) struggling to get by on their primary business, or (ii) poor at allocating excess capital, will expand into other areas. The thought process is simple (yet quite absurd): Business A can only go so far, so I’ll start Business B, C, and D and make a small living from each.
You see it all the time in publicly traded companies. Management has no idea what to do with their present business or excess cash, so they try to expand into other areas – most likely because they want to impress investors. (Think “Institutional Imperative”) Need an example? Check out Citigroup’s list of subsidiary companies as of their 2007 annual report. Let me break it down a bit.
Citigroup has 2,259 subsidiaries on that list. With 2007 revenues of $81.7 billion, that means that its average business generates about $36.1 million a year in revenue. Furthermore, it averaged about $15 billion in net income from 2003 through 2007, or about $7 million from each business.
Those Numbers are Skewed
You bet! We know that Citigroup has some very major, very core businesses – CitiFinancial and Smith Barney come to mind. It’s fair to assume that these core, massive businesses contribute the lion’s share of the revenue. So why does it own Southern Graphics Systems – a graphic design and packaging company – and how much do businesses like this contribute to the owners / stockholders?
No wonder Citigroup shareholders are up in arms, screaming that the company needs to dump some of its less-profitable businesses.
The Institutional Imperative
Citigroup is a classic case of the Institutional Imperative that Buffett speaks of. You have this wonderful investment business, and you go and do something stupid – like buy or start 2,200 more businesses.
Citigroup vs. The Rational, Business Approach
Warren Buffett is the embodiment of “rational, business approach” to growth. Berkshire has 50% more revenue, 2,200 less subsidiaries, and twice the market capitalization of Citigroup. Why? Buffett and Munger read Fisher.
Without any real products to sell, Berkshire’s “product” is capital allocation. To paraphrase (and slightly twist) Fisher, Buffett, Munger, and company have the determination to continue to allocate capital (via acquisitions) that will increase total sales potentials (read: cash flow for more capital allocation) when the growth potentials of current product lines (subsidiaries) have largely been exploited.
Berkshire owns Forest River – a trailer and RV company. Buffett and Munger know it doesn’t have the potential to be as big as Coca-Cola; still, it is an investment that will serve the company’s ultimate goal – to provide the two with more capital to allocate.
What Will Your Managers Do?
It’s not a question of whether or not the company has a lot of subsidiaries. It comes down to focus – does your management have it or not? To expand into new product lines or to make intelligent acquisitions, your management needs to be focused. The deals need to make sense.
When Coca-Cola owned shrimp farms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it didn’t make sense. On the one hand, food and drink go together. Still, shrimp and Coca-Cola / wine / juice? It didn’t make sense. There could be very little resource sharing; Coca-Cola couldn’t minimize expenses because it had to run two very different businesses.
Look at Pfizer. 441 subsidiaries (yes, I know some of them are joint venture or other LLC/partnership-type arrangements). But they are pretty much all drug, research, or healthcare related (except Site Realty, which still has me scratching my head). Pfizer has been beaten down some 60% over the past eight years. Wall Street is worried that the November 2011 expiration of the Lipitor patent will effectively wipe out all $12 billion of Lipitor’s revenues, and destroy the company entirely. Granted, Lipitor generates about 25% of the company’s revenues; still, odds are, neither Lipitor nor Pfizer are not going to disappear entirely.
So, What is Pfizer To Do?
Right now, Pfizer is plowing $8 billion a year into research and development. The ultimate goal: “to develop products or processes that will still further increase total sales potentials when the growth potentials of currently attractive product lines [Lipitor] have largely been exploited.”
Pfizer is generating about $10 billion a year in owner earnings, with only about $2 billion in annual capital expenditures. With the Lipitor patent gone in three years, owner earnings are likely to decrease. What is Pfizer doing to prepare for that? Research and Development (here’s their “in the pipeline” report) and acquisitions of related businesses. Will it pay off? There is no way to know for certain; still, Pfizer management seems to be focused on the right process, and that’s all a shareholder can ask for.
If we start seeing products or acquisitions in unrelated businesses, or if it appears like Pfizer is giving up hope and content to do little more than battle the generics for Lipitor market share, get out of the way. Otherwise, Pfizer seems to fit Fisher’s Point 2 very nicely. It’s not enough to go on, but it’s a start.
Filed under: How to Value a Business
Love this series on Fisher.
I’ve read the book twice and have had a hard time digesting what he writes. I’ve heard some have read Fisher and Graham multiple times and still can’t understand some points entirely.
The modern day references are great.
Thanks for the posts!
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I know of one person that reads The Intelligent Investor once a year. He says each time he reds it, he learns something new.
As for PFE. I own a ton of it. It was actually my first ever stock purchase. I paid way to much for them in hindsight, but as my first ever investment I had no idea what valuation was. I did know quality though
Anyways …. I am hoping that some of that sh!t sticks to the wall. The thing is, I am not overly worried about the dividend. I did a DCF a while ago which assumed that some sh!t stuck to the wall. I came up with an IV in the $30 ballpark. I might be off, but it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong
Toss in a near 50% margin of safety and it is hard to understand what the fear is.
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Every time I reread Fisher, Graham, or other classics, I too feel like I learn something new. Revisiting Fisher two weeks ago, I realized how dated it was. I hope these posts help bring Fisher current, while sticking to the 1950s way of investing. You know, before they had real time quotes, the internet, the stock market channel, etc. Back when the only way to invest intelligently was to buy businesses at a discount and then wait patiently to be rewarded without getting slammed with useless noise!
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The biggest lesson I’ve learned from all the classics is to be patient on the buy side. I’m not afraid to wait and I don’t swing unless it’s (what I perceive to be) a real fat pitch. I miss a lot of upside moves this way, but I have few really big down moves (First rule, don’t lose money, second rule, refer to rule one.) Furthermore, a lot of upward moves that I miss, I get anyway, on the pullbacks. I still haven’t pulled the trigger on PFE, waiting for the dividend cut or for it to be fully discounted and then I’ll back up the truck. BAC is another in the same position, regardless of what the CEO says, I don’t see how they not cut the dividend soon. Every serious investor should read all the above mentioned guys every year or two. My own style is more like Peter Lynch, but he also is influenced by the classics mentioned.
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One thing I am always wondering why some firms are doing just fine in different business and some others are not, yet others are specifically created as conglomerate, such as DHR, GE. So when Comcast wants to invest in Disney, Starbucks wants to be in film business, how we know they are not going to be successful ? I guess that the key is to see if those managers are a good at allocating capticals. We usually assume that they are not good at it ? Suppose they are not going into other businesses, they stick to what they know, have more pipelines, what if the no major block buster drug came out from the pipeline ? Would it better for pfe to extend such a way as JNJ did in 80s so that their revenues can be hedged in long run ?
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Jay, I personally don’t like it when a company like Starbucks expands into the music biz, etc. It smells like desperation to me. I have no problem with conglomerates like GE, who have proven over many years that they know what they are doing, but I shy away from all others. I like it when companies “stick to their knitting”, which PFE is clearly doing. Now if only their P/B X P/E would come down to < 22.5, it’d be a buy for me.
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There is no rule that says “this” is a good acquisition and “that” is a bad one; rather, the question is “does this make sense?”
Comcast and Disney? It can make sense as both are in the entertainment industy. Disney needs a way to bring its product into homes; Comcast brings entertainment into homes. I’m not talking about cruise or themepark Disney, but movie Disney.
Starbucks in the film business? It doesn’t make sense. Talking about (or defending) the investment, Starbucks Chairman Howard Schultz had this to say:
While we are a coffee company at heart, Starbucks provides much more than the best cup of coffee – we offer a community gathering place where people come together to connect and discover new things.
Wrong. You are a coffee company. People plow through your doors to buy coffee, and then leave. Some people might sit around and chat; most come just for the coffee.
Now, Starbucks in a chocolate business, or cardboard cup business, or sandwich business can make a lot of sense. If, from the chocolate business, they then branch off into popcorn, then theaters, and then entertainment, it could make sense many years and many businesses later (like GE). Still, I agree with Rene – a direct investment in entertainment by a Starbucks smells like desperation or bad management (or both).
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You wrote about one of my favs! They are doing both things, trying to hang on to Lipitor as long as possible (they just settled and won an extra year) and maybe buying that Indian company that will do the generic version and as you say, spending $8B/yr on R & D. Meanwhile the dividend, while probably precarious, is pretty fantastic.
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