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Workouts Work Out In Down Markets – Part 3

January 21, 2008  |  Joe Ponzio  |  about:

In Part 1, we looked at the various steps involved in a merger, acquisition, or going private transaction. As the transaction progresses along those steps, the spread between the market price and the closing price tends to close as the transaction becomes more finalized and less risky. In Part 2, we looked at a few deals and analyzed the risk vs. reward as well as the need to really dig in to the SEC filings.

Workouts are meant to be virtually “risk-less” transactions for idle cash in your portfolio. Let’s dive in with that in mind.

I believe that it is human nature for people to want to profit on anything and everything and never lose money in the process. In practice, this is impossible. The number one strength you have is the ability to say “no” and pass on a deal. Buffett does it all the time; I do it all the time; you should do it all the time. Rather than trying to squeeze profits out of everything, wait for that great opportunity and then commit enough of your portfolio so that it has a meaningful impact.

When is a workout a phenomenal, virtually risk-less workout? Here’s what I look for:

Regulatory Approval

First and foremost, I won’t invest in a workout prior to Step 5. (For an explanation of the steps, see Part 1 here.) Keep in mind: risk-less. Investing in a workout before Step 5 is like buying any old stock and hoping that things turn out well. Though these companies have teams of smart people preliminarily looking into the regulatory aspects and pitfalls of the transaction, regulatory approval only comes from regulators.

Why would regulators kill a deal that the companies thought would go through? A quick look at the Bank of America/Countrywide deal says it all. In the U.S., no bank can control more than 10% of the nation’s deposits. Bank of America already controls some 9.98%. Acquiring Countrywide – the mortgage house/bank – would push that control beyond 10%, and only a regulator can temporarily relieve BAC from that requirement.

Will the government allow BAC to control more than 10% of this country’s deposits when there is clearly a law against it? If so, to what degree? Will the Countrywide deal put BAC at 10.2%? 13%? How much leeway will the regulators give, if any?

Prior to Step 5, there are a number of risks, hurdles, and obstacles that still need to be overcome. Investing at this point is more speculation than risk-less.

Shareholder Approval or “Pretty Much Guaranteed” Approval

You know what I don’t want to see? A board that controls just 2% or 5% of the company’s voting stock cutting deals that they can’t close on. When management controls a small fraction of the voting control, they really need the shareholders – or a few large shareholders – to rally behind them to get the transaction done. This is the hurdle that BEA Systems must overcome (discussed in Part 2).

If a few major shareholders acquired stakes as a long-term investment, they may not welcome a merger, acquisition, or going private transaction – particularly if they were acquiring those stakes because they were ultimately planning on bringing in fresh management and masterminding a turnaround or control situation.

When management (and in the case of a merger or acquisition, the controlling company) controls 35% or more of the voting stock, there is rarely a question of shareholder approval. With 35% control of the deal, the company needs just 15% outside shareholder approval – hardly a lofty goal.

Of course, that assumes that the deal hangs on a majority vote, and not a supermajority (66%, 70% or 80% approval).

Financing

When there are no financing contingencies in an acquisition or going private transaction, I’m happy as pie. (I’m not so happy when a company dilutes existing stockholders’ ownership by issuing new shares to complete a merger or acquisition.) When there are financing contingencies, you must decide how that will affect the deal, if at all. If financing is contingent on (a) the deal happening the way it was proposed, (b) there being no material changes in the business, and (c) there being no additional debt issuance, (along with other “general” loan terms and conditions) there usually isn’t a cause for concern.

If, however, financing is contingent on a number of factors – especially the market prices of either or both of the companies – you might run into problems. You have to ask yourself: Is this a pretty straightforward deal or do the lenders have a zillion ways to back out.

The Risk Vs. The Payoff – Assessing The Odds

If all the ducks are in order, it is then time to analyze the potential risk versus reward. The risk: If the deal falls apart, the temporarily inflated stock price will likely drop. The Dow has been getting clobbered and yet Radiation Therapy Services (RTSX) has been holding steady around $30. They are set to go private (assuming shareholder approval and final signatures and financing) at $32.50 a share.

Why? Liquidity has pretty much dried up and few people are willing to buy or sell for much more (or less) than $30 a share because of the going private transaction. If, however, the deal falls through, you’ll see a lot of workout investors and other shareholders getting out – with the stock price dropping in the process.

The RTSX deal is expected to close this quarter. A phone call to the company’s proxy solicitation agent reinforced that (though no additional specifics were given). April 21, 2008 is the final date, after which either party can back out. Shareholder approval (of which management controls more than 40%) is expected at the special meeting of shareholders early next month. (If either party terminates prior to that, there is a $25 million penalty – somewhat hefty considering the size of both companies).

The potential payoff is about 8.8% (from $29.87 to $32.50) on an absolute basis. Assuming the deal goes through just before the April 21, 2008 deadline, that comes out to an annualized return of 28.8%, assuming you did this four times a year and reinvested the full proceeds each time. (Tip: You only need a few deals a year so don’t jump into one today just because you are just learning about workouts and think they are a good idea.)

The downside? Assuming you could get out at $27 (a good-til-cancelled stop order is handy here), your risk is about 10%. Hmmm. 8.8% on the upside, 10% on the down. Doesn’t sound like a good, risk-less transaction, does it?

Play The Odds

As you look at RTSX, or any other workout situation, you have to analyze the odds as well. You’ll have a hard time finding post-Step 5 deals with 20% upside and 5% downside. It just doesn’t happen. So, what are the odds?

What are the odds that this deal will go through? I can’t say for certain, but I do believe that it is better than 50/50. This is nearly a “done deal” and the only things that can upset the applecart seem to be:

  • virtually unanimous shareholder disapproval;
  • a substantial change in RTSX’s business;
  • a major screw-up (and breach of duty) on the part of management or the acquirer.

So long as the odds are better than 54/46 for the deal going through, you’ll make money in the long-term buying workouts like this. On any given workout, you may find yourself on the “46″ side; still, in the long-run, you would be wise to put money in when the long-term odds are in your favor, and sit on the sidelines when they are not.

Some Final Questions On Workouts

On Wednesday, we’ll answer some of those burning questions like:

  • If workouts are so great, why don’t I just do that?
  • Should I consider using margin on my workout positions?
  • Why do I keep missing out on workouts? The premium dries up the instant it is announced!
  • What about class action lawsuits?
  • Is this deal too good to be true?

And above all, remember: You have to read the reports, proxies, etc. on the SEC’s EDGAR system! Know the deal, the companies, and the terms – not just the market price, closing price, and potential pay-off.

Joe Ponzio

By Joe Ponzio

January 21, 2008

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The Discussion
Sam
Sam
January 21, 2008 at 10:18am

Hi – I posted this question earlier. One of the big factors causing wide arb spreads is the reverse termination fee or cop-out that lbo firms and banks are using to get out of deals that have gone all the way to Step 5. How do you judge how ‘tight’ the financing commitment is?

thanks

ME Williams
ME Williams
January 21, 2008 at 10:27am

Sir,

Thanks for another great post!

I have a couple of quick questions.

First Question:

Where did you find the data for:

“In the U.S., no bank can control more than 10% of the nation’s deposits. ”

Second Question:

Where did you find data for:

“Bank of America already controls some 9.98%. Acquiring Countrywide, “the mortgage house/bank would push that control beyond 10%, and only a regulator can temporarily relieve BAC from that requirement.”

Thanks.

Michael Goode
Michael Goode
January 21, 2008 at 11:19am

You are wrong on the BAC thing. There is a loophole in the law allowing a bank such as Bank of America to acquire a thrift (such as Countrywide) that puts it over the 10% limit. This deal does not require a special forbearance on the part of regulators.

Dom
Dom
January 21, 2008 at 6:43pm

Joe, Great Article! Perhaps you can talk about Kelly’s criterion in your “Play The Odds” section. I think it would be a good complement.

Dave Miller
Dave Miller
January 22, 2008 at 12:21am

When it comes to the BAC / CFC deal I would be especially careful. At first glance there are two items to the deal that should give you pause when evaluating this deal.

First in the merger agreement Aricle III (representation and warranties) sec 3.8 (Absence of Certain Changes or Events) on page 16 CFC acknowledges that “(a) Since September 30, 2007, no event or events have occurred that have had or would reasonably be expected to have, either individually or in the aggregate, a Material Adverse Effect on Company.” I don’t think it would be a challenge for B of A to back out of this deal if they wanted to.

Second there is a 160 million dollar break up fee if CFC doesn’t go through with the merger. That is only about 4% of the deal price, very low for a company that is trying to complete the deal.

This deal feels more like BAC has just bought some CFC calls and is waiting to see how the market looks before it chooses to exercise and closes the deal. With a low break up fee it is inviting anyone else with interest to take a look.

At the end of the day they will evaluate the mortgage market and CFC before they close the deal. If they don’t like what they see they claim that events have change meaningfully since Sept 30th. In the mean time they keep the stock propped up so that CFC can make their convertible share coupon payments to BAC

Garrett
Garrett
January 22, 2008 at 1:30pm

Hi Joe:

I’m enjoying this series of articles.

Stop-loss is not a guaranteed out at $27 a share, is it? I thought those things worked where your broker would start trying to sell your stake when it hit your trigger price ($27 in this example) and would sell your stake at a “market price” after the trigger was hit.

If I’m right about that, would that change the 54/46 odds you said were necessary to make this a profitable wager?

Thanks!

Mark
Mark
January 22, 2008 at 5:16pm

Just another thanks on all the great info!!

RISKARB
RISKARB
January 23, 2008 at 1:16pm

RTSX has a 25m dollar reverse breakup fee and damages capped at 40m. Hence the juicy spread. I personally think the deal gets done, but i think that is what is preventing the spread from tightening.

Allen
Allen
January 23, 2008 at 1:57pm

Hi Joe,

Here is a link to a list of arbitrage opportunities from the NY Times: The Great Deal Spread of 2008

I hope this is useful to your readers.

raph
raph
January 23, 2008 at 3:21pm

Hi Joe

Excellent comment once again. What about betting on deals not going through when the spreads are low? Any stat on how many deals go through, how many fail? What the downside of such a strategy?

Thanks for your comment and I look forward to reading your book,

Raph

david
david
January 23, 2008 at 4:18pm

Joe -

Maybe you could do an article on selling?

Your wrote at one point about “buying at 50 cents on the dollar and selling at 90 cents on the dollar.”

That would seem to make more sense than buffets buy & hold forever.

Buy and hold forever means you will have plenty of stocks that would not buy at current prices. That doesn’t seem too logical, even considering taxes/transaction costs.

David

January 23, 2008 at 9:09pm

Allen: Thanks for that great link!

Raph: I can’t say how many deals fall through after Step 5 because it would ultimately depend on the terms of the deals. Workouts with high financing contingencies, small exit penalties, etc. are going to fail more than deals with little or no contingencies and large relative penalties.

Through luck, good fortune, or whatever, more than 90% of the workouts I’ve done have gone through.

David: A great point. I’ll get a post on it in the upcoming weeks.

Mike B
Mike B
January 24, 2008 at 12:16pm

Hi Joe,

I really enjoy your posts. Joel Greenblatt advises against merger arbitrage because he feels it%u2019s too risky. Instead, he focuses on merger securities that are undervalued in the secondary market after the merger occurs. What is your opinion on merger securities as a safer alternative?

Dan
Dan
January 29, 2008 at 5:43am

Hi Joe – I love the arbitrage series…thanks! I’ve noticed RTSX has continued to decline since your original post – down almost 9% as of today. Do the “smart people” know something we don’t?

January 29, 2008 at 10:24am

Dan: RTSX is a very thinly traded stock, and the acquisition anticipation thinned out the trading even more. To date, there have been no reported sales by any insiders of RTSX or the acquirer, Vestar. I went through all of the SEC filings for the individuals (major shareholders and directors) and the companies.

What is likely happening (though time will tell) is that you have a number of arbitrage hedge funds that bought the stock as an arbitrage play. These funds typically put an automated sell based on price. As volume dried up, the price started dropping (few buyers). As the automated sales are filled, the price is dropping to fill those orders by a limited number of buyers and market makers.

This arbitrage play is largely under the radar so you don’t have a ton of individuals or institutions on top of it, keeping the spread thin. After all, RTSX is a $600 million market cap company – too small for many institutions to look at, let alone buy a significant amount.

Do the smart people know something? Perhaps. And that’s the risk we take. Don’t let price dictate your moves; use data and reasoning to make smart decisions.

Mike B: I much prefer engaging in transactions that give me cash on closing. In merger securities, you run the risk of the deal not closing, and then exposure to a short and long position which, in the end, you may not want.

If the RTSX deal fails, I’ll own RTSX. In that case, I may simply sell and move on to the next deal.

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